Search Results for 'explanation'


Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 43, 62-84 (2015). MENTALISTI…
ABSTRACT: In this paper we analyze autism as a hypothetical construct and explain how an Autism Spectrum Disorder diagnosis functions to derail scientific investigations of autistic behavior. To support this argument, we employ a series of behavioral p…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 42, 37-64 (2014). ARE NEUROR…
ABSTRACT: Are the available conceptual foundations, the statistical techniques, and the empirical data of cognitive neuroscience sufficiently robust to serve as foundations for an overarching neuroreductionist explanation of the mind-brain relationship? T…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 41, 11-32 (2013). NON-HUMEAN…
ABSTRACT: Behavior analysis exemplifies a highly peculiar type of explanation in which behavior is said to arise from past interactions with the environment rather than from internal mental states. Radical behaviorism has been advanced as a philosophy of …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 41, 33-59 (2013). FILLING TH…
ABSTRACT: It is often said, especially in philosophy and the neuroscience literature, that Skinner defended an anti-physiological position on the explanation of behavior. Aside from this, behavior analysts who discuss the relation between behavior analysi…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 17-43 (2011/2012). A …
At present there is no explanation for the mind/brain relationship; it is hard to conceive mentalistic explanations in terms of mechanistic explanations, where mechanistic explanations refer to explanations common in the sciences such as neurophysiologica…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 89-92 (2011/2012). CO…
ABSTRACT: Rakover argues that both mechanistic and mentalistic accounts are needed to explain behavior, and his position is based mainly on the fact that physical and mentalistic accounts have existed throughout recorded history, yet all attempts to recon…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 93-102 (2011/2012). M…
ABSTRACT: Rakover has thought about the nature of explanation for a long time and he has written some insightful pieces on the possibility of incorporating mentalistic language into serious explanations of our activities. Here he takes an extreme tack and…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 103-105 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: In contrast to Rakover's approach, I argue that intentional and extensional accounts of behavior are incommensurable, that the former are necessary only when the capacity of the latter to explain behavior cannot be empirically sustained, and tha…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 107-125 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: First I comment on the reasons that motivated me to develop the approach of Methodological Dualism (MD) and Multi-Explanation Framework (MEF) and present a brief summary of its main ideas; second, I respond to the commentators' criticisms; fin…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 127-144 (2011/2012). …
Memes, defined in terms of ideas, mental representations or information, are used in an attempt to explain the spread of cultural practices. We argue that such reference to hidden replicators, which are said to have causal effects on a person
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy. 39/40. 145-202 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: Methodological behaviorism is a stance on verbal processes and the meaning of "psychological" terms and concepts that are deployed in theories and explanations of behavior. According to this stance, all such terms and concepts should be based on…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 61-81 (2010). REPLY TO C…
Six of the seven commentaries expressed basic agreement with our characterization of dispositioning as a typically unacknowledged, pervasive, and often problematic explanatory practice. One of these (Glenn) situated our own interpretive activity within th…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 3-19 (2009). THE ROLE O…
Like most other sciences, behavior analysis adopts an assumption of uniformity, namely that principles discovered under controlled conditions apply outside the laboratory as well. Since the boundary between public and private depends on the vantage point …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 87-104 (2009). INTENTIO…
Discrepancies between animal and human responding on standard schedules of reinforcement have been explained by reference to the human capacity for language and consequent formulation of self-instructions. As a result, schedule responding has been causall…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 119-125 (2009). WHY DIS…
This commentary discusses the major claims and arguments presented by Field and Hineline (2008) against the general use of dispositional causal explanations in science and psychology and in favor of an alternative account that applies to cases in which ca…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 127-133 (2009). PRAGMATI…
I am in agreement with Field and Hineline's excellent essay (2008) concerning the limitations of cause-effect explanation and the derivative problems with person-centered accounts of human action. However, their account is simultaneously limited by its co…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 135-140 (2009). DISPOSIT…
Field and Hineline use the term dispositioning to refer to the tendency to privilege spatially and temporally local entities in psychological explanation. In our commentary we offer reasons for agreeing with their claim that dispositioning is overly preva…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 149-150 (2009). ON EXPLA…
Field and Hineline (2008) offer a sympathetic explanation for the resistance of psychologists and philosophers to explaining behavior as temporally organized phenomena occurring as a function of other events, also often distributed over time. This resista…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 217-222 (2009). ASCRIBI…
Much of the commentary on my paper "Intentional behaviorism" (Foxall, 2007) fails to make contact with my central arguments about the use of intentional language in the explanation of behavior. Marr's (2008) remarks on my responses to that commentary (Fox…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 5-69 (2008). DISPOSITION…
"Now" is privileged in most psychological theories, which portray their processes as proceeding from moment-to-moment. As in any science, this adherence to contiguous causation hinders an account of phenomena that involve remote events or temporally ex…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 71-85 (2008). DRETSKE ON…
In two recent articles and an earlier book Fred Dretske appeals to a distinction between triggering and structuring causes with the aim of establishing that psychological explanations of behavior differ from non-psychological ones. He concludes that int…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 87-96 (2008). THE CONCEP…
The history of psychology has seen recurrent controversies on the circularity of reinforcement explanations, and behavior analysts disagree among themselves as to whether the concept of operant reinforcement is explanatory or descriptive. Some behavior …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 113-155 (2008). INTENTIO…
The central fact in the delineation of radical behaviorism is its conceptual avoidance of propositional content. This eschewal of the intentional stance sets it apart not only from cognitivism but from other neo-behaviorisms. Indeed, the defining charac…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 1-55, (2007). INTENTIONA…
This paper proposes an overarching philosophical framework for the analysis and interpretation of behavior that incorporates both radical behaviorism and intentional psychology in a model, "intentional behaviorism"' that additionally links the explanati…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 101-111, (2007). INTENTI…
This commentary discusses critically the proposal of Foxall's intentional behaviorism that, when the use of intentional categories can be justifiably portrayed as heuristic overlay to theories incorporating radical behaviorist principles, intentionality…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 113-130, (2007). COMMENT…
Professor Foxall suggests the radical behaviorist language of contingencies is fine as far as it goes, and is quite suitable for matters of prediction and control. However, he argues that radical behaviorist language is extensional, and that it is neces…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 139-148 (2007). BEHAVIOR…
Foxall's intentional behaviorism is supposed to provide explanation and understanding where radical behaviorism provides only prediction and control. Foxall does identify empirical and conceptual issues with the operant reinforcement framework, but he …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 89-107 (2006). CLASSIC E…
I analyze the theoretical tenets of early ethology and the criticisms leveled against it from comparative psychology. Early ethology had a clear research object, the study of behavioral adaptedness. Adaptedness was explained by the functional rules and …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 1-16 (2005). THE FUNCTIO…
This paper deals with the functions of intentional explanations of actions (IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent. IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be inst…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 32, 167-177 (2004). PSYCHOLO…
Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are (what I call) triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and (what I call) structuring causes, events t…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 32, 293-303 (2004). THE PERI…
Despite its diminished importance amongst philosophers, the deductivenomological framework is still important to contemporary behavioral scientists. Behavioral theorists operating within this framework must be careful to distinguish between nesting and…
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